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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No: 04-2971
TIMOTHY FRANKS,
Appellant
v.
COUNTY OF LEHIGH, THOMAS LAZORIK,
BRIAN KAHLER, TED KEHM, JANICE E. NESBIT
JANE BAKER, RICHARD O. KLOTZ

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Civ. No. 02-cv-02652)
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 14, 2005
Before: SLOVITER, McKEE and WEIS Circuit Judges
(Filed: August 2, 2005)
OPINION

McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Timothy Franks asks us to review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of his employers in the action he filed against them under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. For the reasons that
follow, we will affirm.
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I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, it is not necessary to recite the facts of
this case in detail. It is sufficient to note that Appellant Franks worked as an accountant
for the County of Lehigh from 1997 until 2001, when he was terminated. Franks suffers
from Type I Diabetes Mellitus (“diabetes”), and during his employment with the County,
he experienced numerous acute hyper- and hypoglycemic attacks that required medical
care. Franks alleges that he is entitled to recover under the ADA because
his supervisors were overly preoccupied with his diabetic
condition and were paranoid about their own potential
personal liability should Franks become injured while at work
as a result of a diabetic attack. . . . the County manipulated his
final performance evaluation to reflect a bogus
‘unsatisfactory’ rating and create a basis for his termination.
Appellant’s Br. at 3.
Summary judgement is only appropriate if, “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with [any] affidavits, . . . show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law," when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56©).
The District Court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework that
so often guides inquiries into employment discrimination. App. 14, citing Shaner v.
Synthes, 204, F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2000). The court found that Franks proved his prima
facie case, but failed to adequately refute the County’s articulation of a legitimate and
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non-discriminatory ground for the adverse employment action taken against Franks.
II.
In Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994), we held that:
[T]o avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff's evidence
rebutting the employer's proffered legitimate reasons must
allow a factfinder reasonably to infer that each of the
employer's proffered non-discriminatory reasons . . . was
either a post hoc fabrication or otherwise did not actually
motivate the employment action (that is, the proffered reason
is a pretext).
To discredit the employer's proffered reason, however, the
plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer's decision was
wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is
whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not
whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.
. . . Rather, the non-moving plaintiff must demonstrate such
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies,
or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate
reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could
rationally find them “unworthy of credence,” . . . and hence
infer “that the employer did not act for (the asserted) nondiscriminatory reasons.”
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (internal citations omitted). The County cited Franks’
incompetence as reflected in performance evaluations over the course of two years, as the
reason he was terminated. Franks sought to discredit this proffered reason by alleging
inconsistencies in the evaluation scheme as a whole. As the District Court summarized:
For example, the point is made that . . . what are apparently
similar grades assigned in a portion of the 1999 evaluation,
which resulted in an overall satisfactory rating, are
inconsistent with . . . what are given as comparable readings,
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but with a different bottom line in the 2000 evaluation.
App. 18. Judge Pollak recognized a lack of coherence in the testimony of Franks’s
supervisors in their explanation of the weighting of the various evaluation factors. App.
19. However, Judge Pollak concluded that the inconsistencies did not demonstrate that
the employer’s stated rationale was a pretext, nor that the employer was motivated by
discriminatory animus. App. 26. In a well-reasoned and thorough oral ruling, Judge
Pollak explained why the defendants were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law, and we can add little to his discussion. See App. 009-028. Accordingly, we will
affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by the District Court in its ruling from the
bench on December 1, 2004.
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